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Abstract: In this paper we put forward a realist account of the 
problem of the accommodation of conflicting claims over 
sacred places. Our argument takes its cue from the empirical 
finding that modern, Western-style states necessarily mould 
religion into shapes that are compatible with state rule. So, at 
least in the context of modern states there is no pre-political 
morality of religious freedom that states ought to follow when 
adjudicating claims over sacred spaces. In which case most 
liberal normative theory on religious accommodation turns out 
to be wrong headed. As an alternative, we suggest the question 
of contested sacred places should be settled with reference to 
the state’s purposes—at least as long as one is committed to 
the existence of modern states. If one finds the state’s 
treatment of religion unsatisfactory, then our argument 
provides a pro tanto reason for seeking alternative forms of 
political organisation. 
Key words: Holy Places; Political Realism; Religious 
accommodation; Religious Conflict; State Legitimacy. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we use the debate over state treatment of sacred 
places as a starting point to show that any answer to normative 
questions of religious accommodation by states—liberal or 
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otherwise, though we will focus primarily on liberal states—
must be subordinated to the question of state legitimacy, 
namely the question of the purposes for which the state may 
carry out its core activities. That is to say, there is no pre-
political morality of religious freedom that the state ought to 
comply with, because the very idea of the political salience of 
religion cannot be separated from the question of state 
legitimacy. Consider, for instance, how actor constellations 
differ in the state formation e.g. after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and in early modern Europe. Or think of the vastly 
different models of so-called state-religion relation within 
contemporary EU states, ranging from established churches to 
purported state neutrality (Cesari 2016) The issue of religious 
freedom or religious accommodation is internal to what it 
means for a state to be a state in its respective context.  
Our argument for that conclusion will rely on an empirical 
claim. We will use historical and anthropological literature to 
show that, at least in the case of the modern (Western) state, 
shaping religion into a legible and governable phenomenon is 
essential to the proper functioning of the state. (Indeed, even 
the accompanying notion of equal citizenship should be 
understood within those constraints.) In a sense, this is a 
debunking genealogy of liberal discourse on religious freedom 
and freedom of conscience: the liberal illusion of a politics 
guided by morality leads those theorists to overlook the 
constraints posed by the nature of their primary tool for 
implementing that morality, namely the state. The guiding 
insight here, to quote Raymond Geuss, is that “ethics is usually 
dead politics: the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching 
out to try to extend its grip to the present and the future.” 
(Geuss 2010: 42) And the victor in the relevant past conflicts has 
overwhelmingly been the state. 
So, concretely, in the case of sacred places we must 
reconcile ourselves to the fact that, so long as the modern state 
is our primary vehicle for the solution to political problems—
problems of non-optional co-existence—religious practices 
broadly speaking ought to be subordinated to the proper 
functioning of state institutions. Whether a certain road ought 
to be kept open on the Sabbath, then, is not a matter of figuring 
out whether doing so is compatible with allowing some 
religious citizens to act according to conscience, or whether it 
hurts their religious feelings. Rather, it is a matter of whether 
the account of religious freedom that counsels closing the road 
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as opposed to keeping it open is the optimal way of fostering 
the state’s purposes, which in turn ought to be specified by a 
theory of state legitimacy, in turn constrained by a realistic 
understanding of the capabilities and limitation of the state as 
a political structure. 
The upshot of our argument is an exclusive disjunction. One 
can either accept the subordination of religious freedom to 
statist priorities or, should one find that conclusion normatively 
unpalatable, one can question the very suitability of the state 
as a social technology for solving political problems. 
The argument proceeds as follows. We begin with a 
schematic picture of the standard way of framing the issue of 
state-religion relations in Anglophone liberal political 
philosophy. We then offer a general critique of that approach, 
drawing primarily on and bringing together two empirically-
oriented bodies of scholarship, on religion and on the state. On 
the basis of that general critique, in the last section we move on 





How should the liberal state accommodate religious demands 
concerning the status of sacred places? The standard way to 
think about that question—indeed that very way of posing it, 
which is prevalent in contemporary Anglophone political 
philosophy—is to try and work out whether granting those 
demands is compatible with the state’s commitment to equality 
for all of its citizens. Much of the debate, then, rests on the 
question of whether it is possible to grant religion a special form 
of protection while relying on non-religious reasons 
appropriate to a liberal state (e.g. Schwartzman 2012 vs 
Koppelman 2014a, 2014b) or, on another end of the spectrum 
of positions, whether religious freedom even needs to be a 
right, or can rather be ‘disaggregated’ across a bundle of other 
rights (Laborde 2015, 2018).1 One way to understand the 
question of whether religion is special is to consider the status 
of religious freedom vis-a-vis other rights:, if freedom of religion 
is a basic liberty for liberal states, what should we do when it 
clashes with other basic liberties? Should, for example, 
blasphemy be prohibited, even against a backdrop of general 
 
1 For a synoptic view of this debate see Batznizky & Dagan 2017. 
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freedom of speech? (see Cesari 2015, 2016). On what 
grounds—if any—can we say that religious freedom should take 
priority over other basic liberties? We will not take sides in that 
debate. We will however query one of its presuppositions, 
namely the idea that there is pre-political sphere of religious 
belief and practice that the state ought to accommodate. To see 
what that means, let us begin by considering this utterly 
simplified version of the standard liberal argument for special 
religious accommodation.  
 
1. The state ought to respect religious freedom. 
2. The state ought to treat all citizens equally.  
3. Respect for religious freedom sometimes requires 
sacrificing other liberties. 
4. Sacrificing some liberties for the sake of religious 
freedom does not violate the equal treatment of all 
citizens. 
5. Therefore, sometimes the state ought to sacrifice some 
liberties for the sake of religious freedom.  
 
Most of the debate on whether religion is special turns on 
the soundness of (unpacked versions of) that argument, or of 
its mirror version that yields a negative conclusion. Typically the 
focus is on the third and/or fourth premise, and the prevalent 
question concerns whether and how the special status of 
religion implied by those premises can be supported from a 
non-religious standpoint. Here, however, we wish to focus on 
the first and second premises. We will not contest their truth, 
as that would be a non-starter in a liberal context. Rather, we 
want to try and see from what premises they may themselves 
follow, in order to show that this way of approaching the issue 
misunderstands the relationship between the state and 
religion—not in a normative but in a descriptive sense, in terms 
of the constraints posed by the nature of the state, as we shall 
see.  
As the schematic argument above shows, the debate is 
typically framed as an exercise in finding policies that are 
respectful both of religious practice and/or belief, and of 
equality between citizens. This in turn presupposes that there 
is a social phenomenon—religion—whose nature is determined 
independently of the state’s political agency. Ditto for equality 
among citizens: the second premise suggests that there is a pre-
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politically determined notion of equality, and that the state 
ought to protect it or promote it.  
Indeed, as one would expect, there is a flourishing debate 
on what liberal equal citizenship is and what it entails, and on 
whether liberal states employ a descriptively correct account of 
religion. It would probably be unwise to try and offer even a 
cursory overview of the debate on equality. Suffice it to note 
that it is typically couched as a matter of first determining the 
sense in which citizens are equal, and then working out how this 
equality may be brought about, through the state and other 
means. What we have in mind, for instance, is the debate on 
“equality of what” (Arneson 1999, Cohen 1993, Sen 1980) and 
the related one on “recognition vs redistribution” 
(Fraser/Honneth 2003; Honneth 1995; Young 1990). To 
simplify, in both cases (but especially in the former) theorists 
try to work out what the currency of egalitarian justice is before 
they proceed to ask what one may do to bring it about, 
including through the agency of the state. This tendency is even 
more explicit in the more recent debate on respect and the 
basis of equality (Carter 2011), which concerns the features of 
human beings that ground the commitment to equal 
treatment, both in private morality and on the part of the 
(liberal) state. In a nutshell, the standard way of grounding the 
second premise in the above argument is to posit that there is 
a pre-political and so state-independent2 notion of equality that 
the state ought to honour. At any rate, given the purposes of 
this paper, we will not discuss the genealogy of liberal equality. 
The debate on the nature of religion and its consequences 
for liberalism, on the other hand, is both more self-contained 
and better suited to introduce the general argument we want 
to put forward here. The debate takes its starting point from 
the contribution of scholars of religion, and puts forward a 
critique of the standard liberal discourse of religious 
accommodation. The general idea is that liberal states claim to 
be inclusive towards all forms of religion, but improved 
descriptions of religious belief and practice show us that that is 
not the case and even, arguably, that it couldn’t be the case. 
Elsewhere one of us called this the descriptive challenge.3  
 
2 The ‘so’ in this sentence is an entailment, not a biconditional. 
It is not as if politics and the state are co-extensive. 
3 To illustrate this challenge and critique it we reproduce, with 
some modifications, parts of the argument from Rossi (2017). 
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The challenge makes a claim against liberalism’s self-
attributed inclusiveness towards all manner of religions. A 
descriptively inaccurate account of religion precludes fair 
treatment of religion. In order to know what to do about 
religion we need to use our best available understanding of 
what religion is. The liberal treatment of religion is normatively 
deficient because it is descriptively flawed (Fish 2000, 
Mahmood 2005, Spinner-Halev 2005, and others). While the 
critique takes various forms as well—not all compatible with 
each other—the most common descriptive critique is that 
liberal religious freedom is unfair to some non-Western 
religions because it is modelled on post-Reformation 
Christianity, particularly Protestantism. The idea is that 
Protestant religion is belief-based, whereas many non-Western 
religions are practice-based (Spinner-Halev 2005). To be sure, 
the view that the liberal posture towards religion is a product 
of the Protestant Reformation is hardly novel in historical 
research (De Ruggiero 1927 [1925], Macpherson 1962, 
Cavanaugh 2009, Gregory 2012), or even in contemporary 
liberal theory (Rawls 1994). What is relatively novel (in political 
philosophy), however, is the thought that this particular 
genealogy of liberal religious freedom generates normative 
difficulties, perhaps more so once the range of religions present 
in liberal polities expands beyond the various branches of the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition. To capture that thought a general 
account of the bare structure of the descriptive challenge to 
traditional liberal religious freedom will suffice. The challenge 
can be schematically presented as follows: 
 
i. Liberal accommodation of religion is modelled on 
Christianity/Protestantism (belief- and/or obligation-
based, private religion). 
ii. Many non-Western religions are not belief- and/or 
obligation-based and/or they are not private. 
iii. In order to be fair, religious accommodation policy must 
be modelled on the salient characteristics of all affected 
religions. 
iv. Thus, liberal accommodation of religion is unfair to 
many non-Western religions. 
 
Cécile Laborde (2015) recently put forward a reformulation 
of this criticism which is more conversant with Anglophone 
politico-philosophical treatments of the issue, rather than with 
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the praxis of liberal states: while traditional liberal law on 
religious accommodation is ultimately capable of correctly 
capturing what is valuable in beliefs as well as expressive 
practices, it is too narrowly focused on matters of obligation 
and conscience. Now this way of putting the point begins to 
show what is not quite right with the standard version of the 
descriptive challenge, namely that it is not obvious that its 
descriptive claims have the advertised normative implications. 
This is because, as Laborde can help us see, premise (iii) above 
is false: 
The political theorists’ approach is normative ... It seeks 
to identify the core values that should be protected by 
the law. As a result, it eschews purely descriptive or 
semantic approaches to legal terms. When it considers 
freedom of religion, it is not concerned with defining 
what religion is – an elusive project at best, as critical 
scholars of religion have amply shown. Rather, it rejects 
any essentialist or semantic approach; and is concerned 
with identifying the core values that the law can 
properly express. ... we would not want the law to 
capture the whole of the value of religion. At best, the 
law will put forward an interpretive notion of marriage, 
or of religion. That a particular law or theory does not 
capture what religion really is, therefore, is not, in itself, 
a sufficient objection to it. What matters is that the law, 
or the theory, expresses and protects the correct 
underlying values. It is at this more fundamental level 
that interpretive approaches must be assessed and 
evaluated. (2015: 593, emphasis added) 
In other words, even if producing a satisfactory and 
relatively uncontroversial description of religion were possible, 
that would not by itself generate an account of religious 
freedom suited to the purposes of liberal law. States are not 
academic institutions. They are not in the business of describing 
reality for the sake of knowledge, nor could they be, if they are 
to remain states. A key feature that makes states states is their 
way of channelling social phenomena so as to fit within their 
pre-constituted aims—chiefly the aim of securing order and 
stability, and achieving legitimacy in doing so.4 As we will see in 
 
4 While these are generally descriptive claims, they become 
normative for us (in Williams’ (2005) sense) when considering 
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some detail below, this resonates both with realist approaches 
to political theory (Rossi & Sleat 2014), and with James C. 
Scott’s (2005) theory of ‘state simplification’, i.e. his analysis of 
states’ tendency to reinterpret and, importantly, transform 
social phenomena to make them legible, and thus amenable to 
the specific kind of rule that comes with the state form. 
For now though, let us focus on Laborde’s response to the 
descriptive challenge: 
... it is not enough simply to say ‘religion is X and Y’. 
What is required is to identify the specific normative 
values which makes X or Y legally relevant. Just saying 
that a practice or institution is multi- faceted and 
internally complex, and irreducible to anything else (as 
is surely the case with religion) does not mean that it 
must be recognized as such in the law. ... So we need to 
know what kind of good is being protected in every case, 
and the good cannot be assumed to follow from the 
mere description of the empirical dimension of religion. 
(Ibid.: 595) 
In which case (iii) needs to be modified: 
...the claim should not be that the existing law does not 
protect all that is religious, according to some ordinary-
meaning, semantic understanding of the term. Rather, 
the claim is that the law fails to protect practices which 
exhibit those normative values – still to be specified – 
which are valuable in religion. (Ibid.: 584) 
The salient values, then, will have to be specified “against 
the implicit or explicit background of a theory of fairness as 
inclusiveness.” (Ibid.: 583)  
However, while Laborde is right to point out those 
shortcomings of the descriptive challenge, we would like to 
identify a sense in which it does not do justice to our best 
empirical understanding of what states are, and so does not 
yield a viable way of framing questions of religious 
accommodation. In a nutshell, our worry is that Laborde’s call 
for determining the place of religion within the liberal state by 
appeal to normative considerations fails to appreciate the 
degree to which those considerations are intertwined with the 
 
the legitimacy of our respective state(s).  
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state itself. In other words, her normativity is pre-political, and 
that is not the kind of normativity suited to political theorising. 
The values that she seeks to specify are moral values. We argue 
that we need to consider what about governing religions, and 
sacred places in particular, is most conducive to the state 
meeting its purposes—purposes which in turn cannot be 
specified simply from one’s moral wish-list, but must be 
understood in light of a correct account of how states may or 
may not deal with religious phenomena. Before asking what the 
state ought to do, we should ask what the state is, and so what 
it may do (which isn’t just a point about feasibility; we will 
return to this issue below). Realists will already be sympathetic 
to this critique. To try and win over those who do not share that 
methodological perspective, we hope to be able to show 
empirically why pre-political normativity won’t do. 
We can come to see what that means by considering the 
empirical case for the falsity of (i). Liberal religious 
accommodation is not modelled on Christianity or 
Protestantism. By its very nature the state gets to pick out the 
features of reality that suit its purposes. What is more, in so 
doing the state actually transforms the object of its rule (à la 
“When you are a hammer, everything looks like a nail”). 
Crudely, the (proto-liberal) state made Protestantism into what 
it is so it could govern it.5 We wish to substantiate that claim by 
combining two sets of observations by empirical scholars from 
disparate fields. First, we will draw on a general account of the 
operation of state simplification and reshaping of reality. 
Second, we will leverage recent research on the historical 
origins of the liberal notion of religion and of its place in politics. 
 
5 Brown, Butler and Mahmood (2013: ix-x) recognize how states 
shape religion when claiming that "secularism does not merely 
organize the place of religion in nation-states…but also 
stipulates what religion is and ought to be”. Their claim is that 
religion becomes “Prostestantized” is separate from the claim 
that Liberal religious accommodation is not modelled on 
Protestantism. Given that many of the people who were in 
favor of state centralization also felt oppressed by the pre-
Reformation order, it is not surprising that it would seem that 
the state’s reshaping of religion contains more elements of 
Protestantism (albeit of the less radical forms). However, the 
people who were pushing for state centralization were not 
necessarily Protestant (e.g. Richelieu in France) (Koyama 2017). 
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The first point has been made most eloquently by James C. 
Scott: 
No administrative system is capable of representing any 
existing social community except through a heroic and 
greatly schematised process of abstraction and 
simplification. It is not simply a question of capacity ... It 
is also a question of purpose. State agents have no 
interest—nor should they—in describing an entire social 
reality, any more than the scientific forester has an 
interest in describing the ecology of a forest in detail. 
Their abstractions and simplifications are disciplined by 
a small number of objectives, and until the nineteenth 
century the most prominent of these were typically 
taxation, political control, and conscriptions. They 
needed only the techniques and understandings that 
were adequate to these tasks. (2005: 22-23) 
Scott draws on a variety of case studies—from state-
sanctioned scientific forestry to land tenure schemes, from 
urban planning to the creation of surnames—to illustrate and 
substantiate this general claim. More precisely, as anticipated, 
there are two claims here: 
These state simplifications, the basic givens of modern 
statecraft ... did not successfully represent the actual 
activity of the society they depicted, nor were they 
intended to; they represented only that slice of it that 
interested the official observer. They were, moreover, 
not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied 
with state power, would enable much of the reality they 
depicted to be remade. (Ibid: 3) 
So, state simplifications both describe selectively, and 
reshape by describing. Recent historical research on the place 
of religion in Western political discourse and practice bears this 
out. Again crudely, historians (and theologians) have shown 
how the very category of religion is a product of the (liberal or 
proto-liberal) state.6 William Cavanaugh summarises his and 
other historians’ findings in this way: 
 
6 This does not mean, of course, that matters of faith and 
worship did not play an important role in the early modern 
struggles that are often called “Wars of Religion” and which also 
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What counts as religion and what does not in any given 
context is contestable and depends on who has the 
power and authority to define religion at any given time 
and place. ... the concept of religion ... is a development 
of the modern liberal state; the religious-secular 
distinction accompanies the invention of private-public, 
religion-politics, and church-state dichotomies. The 
religious-secular distinction also accompanies the 
state’s monopoly over internal violence and its colonial 
expansion. 
... what counts as religious or secular depends on what 
practices are being authorized. The fact that Christianity 
is construed as a religion, whereas nationalism is not, 
helps to ensure that the Christian’s public and lethal 
loyalty belongs to the nation-state. (2009: 59-60)7 
Now, taken in isolation, the point about state simplifications 
and the point about the particular history of the Western liberal 
conception of religion may seem to leave the argument 
untouched. But their conjunction illuminates an important 
point, of realist flavour: the reason why Western states have 
historically tended to treat religion as a belief- and obligation-
centric and univocal practice, or rather to sculpt it into one, is 
that this shape (as it were) is most amenable to the exercise of 
state power. In fact empirical work shows how many states that 
do not fit the Western mould lack the technology and power to 
exert this kind of influence (Daechsel 2011). One might further 
posit that it is for that reason that religions from those societies 
do not take forms that are easily governed by Western states. 
Indeed, some may even argue that it is the only amenable 
shape: the history of progressive enlargement of religious 
freedom, after all, coincided with an increasing standardisation 
of the forms the tolerated religions were supposed to take. In 
fact the notion of religion at stake here crystallised just as the 
early-modern, sovereign state won its evolutionary struggle 
against other forms of political organisation, from the Italian 
city-states to the Hanseatic League, to name just the main 
defeated contenders (see Spruyt 1994). Before the victory of 
the Western modern state over its competitors religion was, in 
 
were the conflicts that led to Western state formation (see 
Diefendorf 2014; Cavanaugh 2014; Murphy 2014). 
7 Also see Gregory (2012) and Van Creveld (2009). 
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a sense, closer to being an alternative though coopted form of 
social organization rather than a subset of social practices at 
least under central state government. 
The point here is precisely that success in regimenting 
religion, in making it legible and so governable, was one 
important factor in the state’s success.8 Or, conversely put, the 
state’s success at making social practices legible from an 
administrative point of view and at expanding its enforcement 
capacity paved the way for moving from identity-based rules to 
general rules which in turn provided support for freedom of 
religion, as Johnson and Koyama (2019: 250-253) have argued. 
The extension of state capacity, e.g. taxation and abolition of 
internal tariffs, correlated with a stronger identification with 
the nation and with “general rules”, as they show by comparing 
grievance books from places just inside and just outside the 
Cinq Grosses Fermes customs union9 in 1788. 
The state’s royal road (as it were) is to mould religion into a 
manageable shape, and the most manageable shape is the 
belief- and obligation-centric one in this case, given the 
desideratum of legal consistency and the technologies of 
legibility and social control made available by the rise of the 
modern European state (Asad 2005). In a nutshell, those states 
made religion relatively toothless by reducing it to a single, 
private practice rather than a public, political contender. This 
sort of simplification is what the state does to make the social 
world legible, itself a precondition for the effective use of its 
power. The process of normative selection is constrained by the 
sorts of things that states are. It is not as if the state—or the 
theorist laying down norms for the state—can discover a 
correct account of what is important or morally relevant about 
religion, and then proceed to devise policies compatible with 
that discovery. States must find ways to coexist with their social 
environment. They do this by making social phenomena legible, 
and in so doing they alter those phenomena. How exactly they 
go about this, depends on the social phenomena and the actor 
constellation in question.10 This process is constitutive of states, 
 
8 As borne out by Spruyt’s (1994) influential reconstruction of 
the rise of the modern state in Europe. 
9 A customs union initiated in 1664 which eliminated internal 
customs and included about half of French provinces at the 
time.  
10 Note here that when Western forms of statehood were later 
“exported” to contexts that had a more diverse religious 
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at least so long as we are concerned with modern, Western-
style states. And that is especially important for liberalism, since 
the modern Western state is the very state form within which 
liberalism developed, and to which—as we know from standard 
Weberian analyses of the bureaucratic rationality of 
statecraft—it is arguably tied by more than mere historical 
contingency. 
 
The state and sacred places 
So far we have looked at the state-religion nexus in general. We 
can now restrict our focus to the issue of sacred places, and in 
particular to contested sacred places11—the hardest cases, in 
light of which it should also be possible to deal with the easier 
ones.12 In what way does the (liberal) state make the issue of 
contested sacred places legible? And what room for normative 
theorising does answering that question leave us?  
It will be useful to begin with the observation that, while 
debates on sacred places are commonplace and the political-
philosophical literature tends to take claims about such spaces 
at face value, if only because that is how they present 
themselves as political problems, there is little agreement as to 
what should count as a sacred place (Greiner 2015; Coomans et 
al. 2012; Coster and Spicer 2005 for the early modern period). 
Deep disagreements across time and place about what 
constitutes a sacred place are rather a key factor for making 
conflicts over contested sacred places so seemingly intractable 
(see comparison between the choreographies of the sacred in 
the context of the different successor states to Ottoman 
Empire, see Barkan and Barkey 2015). Some scholars even 
question whether ‘sacred place’ is a useful analytical category, 
 
landscape, the position that states took toward religion was not 
typically one of toleration and freedom (think of the change 
from the relative religious freedom within the Ottoman Empire 
to the deterioration in the successor states (Cesari 2016). 
11 Our understanding of contested sacred places includes 
conflicting claims advanced by several religious groups as well 
as disputes about whether a place is sacred, e.g. between land 
developers and a religious or tribal community.  
12 We remain neutral on the more abstract issue of whether 
contestation is a necessary feature of politics. If it is, then the 
cases we do discuss are the only relevant ones anyhow. 
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e.g. as opposed to the more accurate and less contentious—
though arguably less politically expedient—‘ritual space’ 
(Williams 2002). That is telling, insofar as it is a way to begin to 
see how sacred places are not part of the fabric of the world, 
but rather the result of social processes of recognition. 
However, that is far too general a claim, and not even a 
particularly controversial one. What we really need to consider 
is the form taken by that process of recognition under the 
hegemony of the state. 
A bird’s eye view of historical, anthropological, and 
archaeological evidence—from the early states of antiquity to, 
more importantly, the modern Western state—shows us a 
tendency towards covariation between political structures and 
ways of recognising the status of sacred places. But 
summarising the evidence for such a long period would neither 
be possible nor necessary here. What is most relevant for our 
purposes is the relationship between the modern state and 
religion. In a number of influential works, Talal Asad has 
demonstrated how religion is not a universal category, nor a 
“given” that states simply have to deal with. Rather, it is a 
“modern historical object” (Asad 1993: 4), shaped by the same 
ideology that accompanied the rise of the modern European 
state: 
 
…what appears to anthropologists today to be self-
evident, namely that religion is essentially a matter of 
symbolic meaning linked to ideas of general order … is 
in fact a view that has a specific Christian history. … 
religion has come to be abstracted and universalized. 
In this movement we have not merely an increase in 
religious toleration, certainly not merely a new 
scientific discovery, but the mutation of a concept and 
a range of social practices which is itself part of a wider 
change in the modern landscape of power and 
knowledge. That change included a new kind of state, 
a new kind of science, a new kind of legal and moral 
subject. (Ibid.: 42-3, emphasis added) 
 
That general attitude translates to the more particular issue 
of the state’s handing of issues of spatial conflict. To crudely 
simplify, the state’s simplification strategy always played a role 
in determining what was to count as a sacred space, and what 
such recognition entailed. There is no such thing as sacred 
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space—at least in a politically salient sense of the term—that 
isn’t the product of state agency, at least to a significant 
extent.13 One important consequence of that fact is that we 
cannot make epistemically reliable moral judgments as to why 
the state treats claims for or against special status for certain 
spaces with fairness, since the very notion of sacred space in 
play is typically itself the product of the state.14 The way that 
the category of religion is shaped by state simplifications might 
lead one to expect sacred places to have decreased in 
importance proportional to the increase in state capacity, given 
the preferences state have for belief centered understanding of 
religion. In as far as sacred places stand in for a rival, ritual and 
practice centered understanding of religion, sacred places are 
reminders of the still ongoing struggle between state 
simplification and alternative forms of social organization. That 
the governance of sacred spaces is one of the areas in which 
contemporary states take recourse to identity-based rules, the 
replacement of which with general rules was one of the 
hallmarks of the advent of the modern state form, attests to 
this challenge. There is then a remaining tension in the state’s 
making sacred places legible: Through seeking to make the 
social power of the sacred subservient to its purposes through 
applying state simplifications, the state still gives the concept of 
the sacred just enough continued social recognition for it to 
challenge the state form later. 
Where do those broadly descriptive considerations leave us 
in terms of normative options to direct political agency? In their 
seminal paper on sacred places, Gideon Sapir and Daniel 
Statman helpfully classify and review the most common 
philosophical rationales for special accommodations of claims 
on sacred places. We are inclined to agree with their conclusion 
that “the theoretical basis for the special protection granted to 
holy places is not entirely clear and is rather unstable” (2016: 
153), so we will not take issue with any of their critiques of the 
various positions they discuss. Indeed, we will shortly argue 
 
13 While not dissimilar, struggles for being recognized as a state 
and struggles for being recognized as a sacred space do not take 
place on the same level. The outcomes of the former have a 
much stronger effect on the latter than vice versa. 
14 By analogy, this is as if an author were asked to referee her 
own paper. There are good epistemic reasons against that 
practice. We develop this method of realist ideology critique in 
(Prinz & Rossi 2017, Rossi & Argenton 2016). 
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that one should be even more sceptical of standard liberal 
political philosophy on this issue. Sapir and Statman also note 
that they find it “rather upsetting to be reminded that social 
and legal arrangements are often much more a result of power 
relations than of moral principles.” (ibid.: 154) We lack the 
resources to determine the extent to which reality is upsetting. 
However, the preceding discussion should help establishing two 
points with regard to Sapir and Statman’s conclusions and, 
more generally, with what a realist approach to political 
philosophy would recommend regarding the state’s choices 
with regard to sacred places. 
First, we would like to sketch an extension of Sapir and 
Statman’s scepticism about extant philosophical accounts of 
the special status of sacred places (be they based on freedom 
of conscience, on cultural rights, or on other accounts of the sui 
generis status of religion). If our argument succeeds, it shows 
that it is not as if the correct way of squaring the religious 
freedom-equality circle has not yet been found. Rather, it 
cannot be found because trying to regiment state agency with 
pre-political moral principles is only possible if one 
misunderstands what sort of entities states are. For states are 
not as pliable to one’s normative wishes as political 
philosophers often assume they are, though that is not to say 
that there is a universal logic of statecraft—contextualism 
remains key in a realist framework. And the often contradictory 
rationales for religious accommodation found in academic and 
public discourse are, more likely than not, simply the ideological 
residue of different ways of negotiating the task of state 
simplification, to return to Scott’s terminology. For instance, as 
some liberal states simplify through neutrality and some 
through laïcité while claiming adherence to broadly similar or 
overlapping sets of constitutional commitments, it is not 
surprising that ostensible justificatory tensions should emerge. 
All of these simplification strategies are imperfect and leave 
residue, i.e. cases that don’t quite fit the mold. 
Here one may wonder whether we haven’t lapsed into the 
descriptive fallacy Laborde aptly diagnoses in parts of ‘critical 
religion’ scholarship. To address that objection we need to 
appreciate why our point about the state is not merely one 
about feasibility constraints, though it may at first sight appear 
so. The objection is this. The fact that states mould social 
practices such as religion to suit their purposes says nothing 
about whether they have (moral, prudential, etc.) reason to do 
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that, unless one can also show that such state simplification is 
also the only feasible option. But that objection fails to 
appreciate the import of Scott’s point about state 
simplifications: it’s not as if states chose to behave as they do. 
If they didn’t behave that way, they wouldn’t be states. Besides, 
the realist argument we put forward does explain why states 
mould religious phenomena into easily governed shapes: the 
issue is that states need to solve what Bernard Williams (2005) 
has called the “first political question”, namely the provision of 
legitimate order. Or, in Sapir and Statman’s parlance, “the fear 
of violence and public disorder” (ibid: 153-4).15 And, as we have 
seen, modern states on the European model have quite specific 
ways of achieving those aims. To be sure, the priority of 
answering the first political question still leaves many 
normative questions open as to how the state may best pursue 
that goal. How the purposes of the state are specified in a 
particular context is not something for political philosophers to 
determine.16 It should be left to the rough and tumble of politics 
which wins the day.  
The important point, though, is that this realist approach 
opens a new way of thinking about the justification of religious 
accommodation, at least in political theory. Indeed the 
approach we have in mind is familiar to constitutional scholars, 
according to whom religious accommodation is a matter of 
balancing state priorities and the requests of religious groups 
(Eisgruber & Sager 2007). Now, political theorists are typically 
dismissive of that approach17: crudely, if there are obligations 
to respect religious commitments, balancing just won’t do. But 
here we have shown that this type of moralistic reasoning 
requires, inter alia, the false premise that religion is 
independent of the state and therefore must be treated fairly 
 
15 After all, the links between liberal realism and the ‘liberalism 
of fear’ championed by Judith Shklar are well understood by 
now (Forrester 2012). 
16 At the very least in democracies, there should be limits to 
what can count as politics rather than raw domination (see 
Prinz and Rossi forthcoming). 
17 Jobani and Perez (2018) capture the hard nature of those 
choices in their insightful outline of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a range of approaches to the governance of 
contested sacred sites. However, they do not consider how the 
state has shaped the category of religion and hence their 
outline is of limited use for our purposes. 
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by it. The realist lesson is that there is no pre-political morality 
of religious freedom. So, in a way, the realist approach we 
propose can afford a vindication of the relatively hard-nosed, 
gritty reasoning found in constitutional theory and practice.  
We would then argue for an approach according to which 
the recognition and regulation of sacred sites depends on the 
state’s judgment of what would minimize the chance of failing 
to provide a legitimate order. That is not to say, however, that 
might makes right. As Bernard Williams argued (2005), and as 
much realist literature has shown, the establishment of order 
does not count as a proper political relationship—as opposed 
to mere suspended warfare—if the order does not in some way 
make sense to those subjected to it (Ceva & Rossi 2012, Sleat 
2014).18  
Such an approach would not involve compromise between 
“state” and “religion”. Governing contested sacred places 
should on our account be guided by prudential reasoning by 
states about the effect on the legitimacy of the political order 
rather than by trying to determine which religion has the most 
objective claims to “holiness” or “sacredness” of a place.19 
Compromise between state and religion could not play a central 
role, because the religious arguments, according to our 
arguments above, are not—now and around here—state-
independent artefacts. Such an approach would divide conflicts 
over contested sacred spaces into two main categories (the 
separation of which is not neat) and recommend responses 
accordingly. 
 On the one hand, there is conflict over contested sacred 
places as power struggle over social and political control (of the 
purposes) of the state (e.g. which religion, if any, the state 
 
18 Importantly, this is not a moral commitment but a point 
following from a conceptual claim about the distinction 
between politics and war (Hall 2015). On the normative status 
of this claim there is an ongoing debate (see e.g. Jubb and Rossi 
2015a, 2015b, Erman and Moller 2015, Prinz 2019). 
19 Here one may reasonably worry that such an approach may 
give some groups a threat incentive: are groups more likely to 
have their demands met the more they menace public order? 
To avoid a straightforward affirmative answer, it seems that 
those in charge will have to make complex cost-benefit 
calculations. It is not in the spirit of realist political theory to 
provide detailed blueprints or algorithms for how those 
calculations should be conducted (Rossi 2019). 
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favours). If conflicts over the governance of sacred places boil 
down to such power struggles, according the latter special 
status would distract from what these conflicts are about.20 In 
as far as claims regarding sacred places are instrumental to 
gaining control of state power, without seeking to transform 
the state form, no special governance provisions would seem 
necessary on our approach, though there may well be 
borderline cases.21  An example of this could be the dispute over 
the newly funded settlement of Rajneeshpuram in Oregon in 
the early 1980s: a minority religious group started settling an 
area adjacent to a pre-existing city (Antelope), and 
subsequently obtained incorporation as a new city whose local 
government, including education and security, it completely 
controlled (Richardson 2004). The ensuing—successful—legal 
challenge by the Oregon State Attorney was ostensibly centred 
on the US Constitution’s Establishment Clause. Our political 
realist reading, however, is in line with what jurisprudence 
scholars of the American legal realist school would say: judicial 
decisions of this kind are always determined by extra-legal 
factors (moral and political convictions, interests, etc. – see 
Leiter 2010). In particular, we think that a realist approach 
counsels giving priority to extra-legal considerations pertaining 
to the successful answering of the first political question.   
 On the other hand, there is conflict over contested sacred 
places which involves a challenge to the state as the main form 
of social organization. Here the task of the state would be to 
provide arguments for why it provides a superior form of social 
organization for all considered. Such a challenge comes to the 
fore when the understanding of the sacred presented in the 
contestation is incompatible not only with the state’s particular 
policies, but with state simplification of religion altogether, e.g. 
because they cannot capture the sacredness at issue. Consider 
the recent protests over e.g. the Dakota Access pipeline. The 
 
20 To be sure, there are important differences if one of the 
groups involved has been discriminated against or is at the 
weaker end of a historical power differential relating to state 
capture. As we have suggested above, in liberal democracies 
there should be limits to how far the rough and tumble of 
politics may cater to the interests of a very limited segment of 
the population. We cannot, however, do justice to this issue 
here. 
21 Our schema does not, however, cover international conflicts 
over sacred places. 
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Native American Standing Rock Sioux Nation claims that the 
construction of the pipeline would disturb their sacred land. 
Existing legislation for the protection of freedom of religion, 
however, has not served Native American religions, despite the 
“American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act” of 1978. 
Arguably due to the divergence of their land-based 
understanding of religion from state simplified religion, Native 
American groups’ understanding of the sacred is not protected 
within the US state (Wenger 2017). If conflict over sacred space 
involves a claim to self-determination/sovereignty, it is a direct 
challenge to the state order (Wenger 2018). If conflict over 
contested Native American sacred land is a case of mobilizing 
interpretations of a concept (the sacred)  which are less 
compatible with the (current form of the) state than the 
established interpretations (that have been shaped by state 
simplifications) in order to change the state from within, then it 
is a hybrid between the first and second category. Importantly, 
the example is further complicated by the fact that a group that 
was forcibly integrated into the state society, can only achieve 
recognition for its claims through the organs of that state—a 
state that disregarded its prior claims to self-governance. 
Dealing with such challenges is less a question of adjudicating 
between competing claims than a question of finding out 
whether state-based politics can satisfactorily incorporate the 
claims of groups that have historically been marginalized, in 
many ways precisely through state simplification and other, 
even more brutal forms of state-building.  
Building on that last point, we want to point out how we are 
left with an exclusive disjunction (which may or may not 
exhaust the available options — at any rate, the two we 
mention strike us as the most appealing ones. We will not try to 
adjudicate between them). On the one hand, one may embrace 
the hard-nosed priority of the first political question. On the 
other hand, even if one is reconciled to abandoning the moralist 
search for pre-political moral principles to guide state agency, 
one may still be disappointed with the limitations imposed by 
the ontology of states22. And so the issue of sacred places may 
become a gateway to the radical conclusion that the very 
existence of states is normatively problematic: perhaps there 
are commitments and social practices (such as religion, 
 
22 On the compatibility between realism and anti-statism, see 
Raekstad (2018). 
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whatever that may be) which we have reason to value more 
than we value the goods provided by states.23  
That is not to say that if one is unhappy with statism one can 
then retreat into moralistic pre-political commitments. One 
must still reckon with the need for political institutions, at least 
as long as humans have no choice but to coexist in non-optional 
associations, as seems to be inevitable for creatures such as 
ourselves24. And also for that reason prospects for a pre-
political morality of religious freedom seem dim. The question 
for radically-minded realists, then, is whether there are non-
state frameworks and institutions that can enact more 
satisfactory ways of making sense of the politics of religion.25 
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